We investigate mutual funds' proxy voting records on shareholder proposals for the period July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2004. The data consist of the voting records of 433 mutual funds from 24 fund families. The final sample includes over 29,000 shareholder proposals covering 528 firms. We investigate three main questions. First, we study the determinants of mutual funds' voting policies across firms. Next, we examine the incentive structure of mutual funds that could act as a motivational force for them to undertake an activist role in their proxy voting behavior.
Determinants and Consequences of Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds on

Shareholder Proposals
Introduction
An important corporate governance mechanism is the voting rights of shareholders. This allows shareholders to assert their ownership rights and reduce conflict of interests between management and shareholders. Shareholders not attending a company's annual meeting may choose to vote their shares by proxy by allowing someone else to cast votes on their behalf.
Institutional investors take the responsibility to vote on behalf of individual investors, who are the owners of their portfolio shares.
1 This gives the institutions the responsibility to cast votes in the direction that would maximize their shareholders' wealth and rights. However, without the requirement of the disclosure policy on how institutions vote on their proxies, shareholders are unable to assess whether the agents they hire vote consistent with their interests. Given that institutional investors approximately hold 66 percent of all U.S. publicly traded stocks, this issue has become increasingly more important in recent years. On January 23, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to adopt a new rule requiring mutual funds to disclose their proxy voting records on an annual basis. 2 A Morningstar representative's comment was, "I hope that will put more pressure on funds to be more activist, at least in terms of how they vote their proxies." 3 This recent regulatory requirement for mutual funds to disclose their proxy votes allow us to investigate the monitoring role of mutual funds on shareholder proposals. 4 We investigate the following three issues. First, we study the determinants of mutual funds' voting policies on shareholder proposals across firms. Next, we examine the incentive structure of mutual funds that could act as a motivational force for them to undertake an activist role in their proxy voting 1 Voting behavior of institutions is studied by Brickley, Lease, Smith (1988) , DeJong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2005) , Gillan and Starks (2000) , and Parino, Sias and Starks (2003) , and Van Nuys (1993) among others. 2 Davis and Kim (2006) present an overview of the events that lead to the SEC regulation on proxy vote disclosure for mutual funds. 3 The New York Times, January 15, 2006. 4 A debate surrounds around the effectiveness of shareholder activism through shareholder proposals. Karpoff (2001) provide a survey on shareholder activism and conclude that shareholder proposal is effective in changing the governance structure of firms; however it has negligible impact on share value and earnings. Other survey includes Black (1998) , Gillan and Starks (1998) , Gillan and Starks (2000) , and Romano (2001) . Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2005) find that frequency of implementation of shareholder proposals has increased over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] and likelihood of implementation increase with better governance structure of firm. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) find that six anti-takeover provisions have negative valuation consequences and they are also most common in shareholder resolution.
behavior. Last, we investigate the trading behavior of mutual funds after the release of voting records to analyze whether mutual funds engage in "Wall Street Walk", that is sell off their shares when dissatisfied with firms' management.
There are concerns that the voting behavior of mutual funds could be influenced by the potential or existing business relationship with the firms, arising from the conflict of interests between fund holders and fund management. 5 Rothberg and Lilien (2005) provide an in-depth analysis of the proxy voting policies of the largest 10 fund families. They report that proxies are voted as a block across all the funds in a fund family and are voted in accordance with the policies that are laid out in the proxy voting disclosure. Their results do not support the notion that conflicts of interest cause a difference in voting behavior. The authors report that index funds vote against management more often than the more actively managed funds, although the difference is small and mostly due to the Vanguard Group. Davis and Kim (2006) analyze the issue of conflicts of interest in more detail and show that the voting pattern across firms by the funds is determined by the voting policies of the respective fund families and is independent of client ties or ownership concentration. However, they find that fund companies with a larger client base tend to adopt voting strategies that are more supportive of management compared to fund companies with a smaller client base. This supports the notion that the risk of alienating current and future clients is more for fund families with a larger client base and outweighs any benefits from a higher portfolio valuation or better reputation through shareholder activism.
This paper significantly extends the literature by further investigating the issue of mutual funds' voting policies and shedding light on what contributes other than business ties to their voting strategies across firms for different shareholder proposals. We examine whether mutual fund family voting is influenced by the family characteristics, characteristics and performance of the firm, governance structure of the firm, type of proposals, and ownership structure of the firm.
We also investigate whether mutual funds engage in a differential monitoring role based on their investment horizon. We also extend the literature by examining the incentive structure of mutual funds that could act as a motivational force for them to undertake an activist role in their proxy voting behavior. Finally, we analyze the trading behavior of mutual funds after the release of 5 There are relatively a few studies addressing the conflict of interests of institutional investors with regard to proxy voting behavior. Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) identify non-bank trusts, insurance companies, and commercial banks as conflicted institutions, which support management on anti-takeover amendments. Moreover, public pension funds, mutual funds, and foundations are less influenced by management pressure and oppose management on these issues. Van Nuys (1993) studies proxy vote solicitation at Honeywell Inc. in 1989 and argue that the difference in voting behavior between institutions is not due to the existing business ties with the company. Delong, Mertens, and Rosenbloom (2005) examine the voting behavior of shareholders at the annual general meetings in the Netherlands and find no evidence suggesting that the voting behavior of banks and insurance companies is influenced by the conflict of interest.
voting records and investigate whether mutual funds engage in "Wall Street Walk", that is sell off their shares when dissatisfied with firms' management.
Gordon and Pound (1993) examine the voting outcome on shareholder proposals. 6 They find that proposals receive more votes when they propose a direct restoration of shareholders' voting rights; when long-run stock performance has been poor; when the corporation has in the past enacted a large number of takeover defenses; when the insider ownership is low and outside block-holder ownership is high; and when they are sponsored by large institutional investors or active dissidents. In the light of this study, we examine whether mutual fund families voting policies are influenced by the family characteristics, characteristics and performance of the firm, governance structure of the firm, type of proposals, and ownership structure of the firm.
Our data consist of the voting records of 433 mutual funds from 24 fund families. The final sample includes over 29,000 shareholder proposals covering 528 firms. Our results suggest that bigger fund families tend to take management side on shareholder proposals. We find that small firms receive more shareholder support from mutual funds. 7 As the manager of Olstein Financial Alert said "We want to focus on small companies, where we can have more influence."
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Mutual funds favor shareholder proposals in firms with better past performance, which contradicts the results of the voting outcome as documented by Gordon and Pound (1993) . We argue that higher visibility and likelihood of greater valuation consequences through improved governance provisions make the good performing firms more attractive for monitoring by mutual funds.
Mutual funds' voting policies are also influenced by the existing governance structure of the firm. Specifically, the existing anti-takeover provisions of the firms have a positive effect on funds' percentage support on shareholders' proposals, suggesting that mutual funds undertake a monitoring role in firms that have a higher resistance to market for corporate control and hence that are more likely to have entrenched management. 9 This suggests that in the absence of an external governance mechanism through a takeover market, an internal governance mechanism through voting provisions undertakes substitute monitoring role in order to discipline managers.
Higher level of internal monitoring mechanism through block-holder ownership leads to higher 6 Gillan & Starks (1999) also examine voting outcome and show that both the voting outcome and stock market response of the proxy proposals depend on the proposal type and sponsor identity. 7 Amzaleg, Ben-Zion, and Rosenfeld (2005) also find that smaller firms receive greater shareholder support by mutual funds in Israel. 8 The New York Times, January 15, 2006. 9 Another competing argument is that higher anti-takeover provisions increase bargaining power of target board. However, the literature suggests that managerial entrenchment dominates the enhanced bargaining effect (Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2002) ).
percentage support on shareholder proposals by mutual funds. This implies that mutual funds undertake complementary monitoring role in their voting decision with the level of internal monitoring mechanism through block-holder ownership. In addition, the possibility of management entrenchment through higher level of managerial ownership leads to superior monitoring by mutual funds. However, the presence of higher voting rights of insiders in dual class shares discourages mutual funds to vote against management as their voting is unlikely to change the outcome of the proposal. The results further indicate that mutual funds engage in an active monitoring role by supporting shareholder proposals in firms with higher market dissatisfaction and higher possibilities of improving governance structure.
Literature suggests that because of the free-rider problem, only investors with a large stake in the firm have incentives to undertake monitoring activities, since their gain from monitoring is likely to surpass the associated monitoring cost. 10 We investigate whether mutual funds with large holdings take an active monitoring role in enhancing the governance mechanism of firms. Our results on the effects of ownership on voting decision indicate that mutual funds take management sides more when they have a large ownership stake in a firm. 11 This could be due to the causality problem that mutual funds have larger stakes in firms where they are supportive of management policies. Moreover, we observe that mutual funds have superior oversight when they have a longer investment horizon. This suggests that, since the turnover of portfolios of the mutual funds industry is typically higher as compared to other institutional investors, their motivation to take an activist role do not come from the ownership structure, but rather from their long-term investment goal.
The voting behavior of mutual funds is also influenced by the types of proposals. The proposals related to the repeal of anti-takeover provisions, which have a direct positive effect on shareholders' wealth and rights, receive higher support. 12 However, mutual funds predominantly seem to side with management on issues related to executive compensation. Analysis of this behavior requires a better understanding of the relation between mutual funds' management and company management that goes beyond published business ties.
Next, we observe the incentive structure of mutual funds if they undertake a monitoring role in shareholders' resolution. Davis and Kim (2006) argue that if fund management's activism increases portfolio value through better governance provisions, this will eventually lead to a 10 Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1980), Huddart (1993) and Gillan and Starks (2000) , 11 Amzaleg, Ben-Zion, and Rosenfeld (2005) also find that firms with higher ownership concentration receive less shareholder support by mutual funds in Israel. 12 Our proposals related to repeal of anti-takeover provisions are among the six anti-takeover provisions identified by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) (Rothberg and Lilien (2005) ). Analyzing the trading behavior of mutual funds after the voting record release allows us to investigate whether mutual funds display such behavior. Our results indicate that mutual funds that provide a higher percentage of support on shareholder proposals engage in reducing their holdings after the release of voting records.
This suggests that mutual funds that are discontent with firm management support shareholder proposals in order to improve the governance provisions of the firms; however, they also reduce their holdings after the voting process. One could argue that, if mutual funds intend to benefit from the better governance provisions that would be implemented if the voting outcome is a success, they should increase or at least maintain their holdings. The reduction of their portfolio holdings suggests that anticipating a negative outcome, mutual funds sell off their shares. Hence the mutual funds' vote for shareholder rights before they reduce their holdings suggests that when dissatisfied with management, mutual funds undertake a monitoring role before they engage in "Wall Street Walk." 13 The causal link between corporate governance and equity price is not fully established, however, there is growing empirical evidence that corporate governance can substantially increase shareholder value. See Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2002) for an overview of corporate governance. 14 Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) study institutions' "voting with their feet" around forced CEO turnover.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our sample and data source. In Section 3, we present our analysis of determinants of mutual funds' voting policies across firms. In Section 4, we examine the reputational effect of mutual funds for undertaking an activist role in their proxy voting decision. We investigate the trading behavior of mutual funds after the release of voting records in Section 5. Finally, we present our conclusion in Section 6.
Sample and Data
In this section we describe our sample and data. In Section 2.1, we discuss our sample and describe our data source. In Section 2.2, we analyze the voting pattern of the fund families. In Section 2.3, we discuss our categorization of proposals and present the voting pattern of sample fund families in these categories. In Section 2.4, we present the linkage between the voting behavior and the investment decision.
2.1Data
On January 23, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to adopt a new rule requiring mutual funds to disclose their proxy voting records on an annual basis. 15 The new voting disclosure rules adopted by the SEC require both mutual funds and investment advisers to disclose the policies and procedures they utilize with respect to voting portfolio securities. Mutual funds are also required to disclose their complete voting record on Form N-PX, which needs to be filed no later than August 31 of each year and needs to cover the most recent 12-month period that ends on June 30 of the same year. The N-PX Form contains the following information: the name of the issuer of the portfolio security; the exchange ticker symbol and CUSIP number of the portfolio security; the shareholder meeting date; a brief identification of the matter voted on; whether the matter was proposed by the issuer or a shareholder; whether the fund voted on the matter and how the fund voted; and whether the fund voted for or against management.
We obtained the mutual funds' proxy voting records of shareholders' proposals for 24 fund families for the year 2004. Fund families and the corresponding funds are selected on the basis of total net assets. We compute the total net asset value of all funds in the year 2004. The size of a fund family computed by aggregating the total net assets of all the funds in a fund family. We identify the top 24 fund families with respect to the aggregate total net assets to 15 Davis and Kim (2006) Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) governance scores, which are obtained from their Web site. sample, management required a vote "against" the proposals 99 percent of the time. As robustness checks we perform an analysis excluding proposals that management required a vote of "for" the proposals and the results remain the same.
Voting Pattern
Types of Proposals
Our sample data includes 75 types of proposals, which are reported in Appendix B. We group these proposals into seven broad categories following the existing literature. Gillan & Starks (2000) , Rothberg & Lilien (2005) , Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) . 19 The wealth implication of all the proposals in this category is not documented in the academic literature. We include proposals in this category on the basis of the perception of the proposals by the popular press and activist community.
category includes proposals related to the audit committee and the OTHERS category includes all social and ethical related proposals. 
Variation in Voting Behavior with Investment Horizon:
We investigate whether mutual funds with different investment horizons display different proxy voting behavior. We hypothesize that mutual funds with a longer investment horizon will tend to be more active in their monitoring role compared to other actively managed funds with a shorter investment horizon, since their gain from monitoring would be higher as a result of the longer horizon. Typically, value funds have a longer investment horizon, and hence we examine whether value funds are more vigilant in guarding shareholders' interests in their proxy voting behavior. We test the fund voting behavior with respect to investment horizon by using fund portfolio turnover ratio as another proxy for the investment horizon. The fund portfolio turnover ratio is computed by dividing the minimum of aggregate sales or aggregate purchase of securities by the average 12-month total net assets of the funds. We consider the average turnover ratio of funds over the five years before the shareholder proposals as a proxy for the funds' investment horizon, where higher (lower) turnover ratio implies funds with a short (long) investment horizon.
Funds are ranked in 10 deciles based on turnover ratio in ascending order, with decile 1 the least turnover funds and decile 10 the most turnover funds. We computed the average percentage votes cast "for" and "against" on shareholder proposals across these 10 deciles. Figure 1 shows the voting pattern for the 10 turnover deciles. Figure 1A shows the average percentage of votes cast "for" by the 10 turnover deciles. We observe that the higher the turnover decile the lower the percentage of votes cast "for" the shareholder proposals. This suggests that mutual funds with a shorter (longer) investment horizon tend to be less (more) supportive of shareholder proposals. Figure 1B shows the average percentage of votes cast "against" by the 10 turnover deciles. The figure shows that low turnover decile funds tend to oppose shareholder proposals less often compared to funds in high turnover deciles. This again suggests that mutual funds with a longer (shorter) investment horizon tend to be less (more) supportive of management and more (less) supportive of shareholders. The difference between the two extreme deciles 1 and 10 is presented in Table 5 . The table shows the mean and median of the percentage votes cast "for" and "against," their differences and statistical significance of the differences between the two extreme deciles. We observe that both the mean and median differences are statistically significant. The results reiterate the notion that mutual funds with a longer investment horizon tend to be more supportive of shareholder proposals compared to funds with a shorter investment horizon.
Determinants of Mutual Funds' Voting Policies across Firms
The voting records of mutual funds suggest that their voting pattern varies across firms.
For example, for a shareholder proposal on "repeal of poison pill," a mutual fund could vote "for" the proposal for a particular firm, but vote "against" the proposal for another firm. This variation in voting pattern across firms is our rationale for investigating the determinants of the mutual fund voting behavior. Davis and Kim (2006) Davis and Kim (2006) show that mutual fund voting behavior is not influenced by the business ties with the firm. The authors state that "mutual funds may have to bite some feeding hands in order to appear even-handed; yet they also have incentives to create policies that lead to less hand-biting." The question we address is what determines which hands they are going to bite and which hands they are going to let go. That is, we further investigate the issue of their voting policies and shed light on how mutual fund families' voting pattern varies across firms for different shareholder proposals. In Section 3.1, we examine the variation of voting behavior in extreme portfolios based on firm characteristics, performance, and existing anti-takeover provisions. In Section 3.2, we present our empirical findings of the determinants of mutual funds' voting policies across firms. In our analysis we do not include the proposals related to environment, social, and ethical issues that are categorized as OTHERS in the paper, as the implications of these proposals to shareholder value are not clear.
Variation of Voting Behavior in Extreme Portfolios
A. Firm Characteristics and Performance
We first examine whether funds' voting behavior varies in extreme portfolios based on firm characteristics and performance variables, and we report our results in Table 6 . 22 FIRM SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of a firm in the previous quarter of the proposal.
We construct 10 portfolios based on size, where P1 represents the portfolio with the smallest firms and P10 represents the portfolio with the largest firms. BOOK TO MKT is the book-tomarket ratio of the firm in the previous quarter of the proposal. Similar to size, we construct 10 portfolios based on book-to-market ratio, where P1 represents portfolio of glamour stocks and P10 represents portfolio of value stocks. As a measure of historical long-run performance of the firm, we introduce HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN, which is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the firm over the five years prior to and ending three months prior to the proposal meeting date. Performance-based portfolios represent P1 as the worst performing firms and P10 as the best performing firms. Table 6 shows the mean and median of the percentage support of shareholder proposals and statistical significance of the differences between the two extreme portfolios. In Panel A votes cast "for" or "abstain" are considered as votes against management and in Panel B only votes cast "for" are considered as votes against management.
We observe that in both panels, the mean of shareholder proposals support on portfolios of small firms (P1) is higher than the mean of support on portfolios of large firms (P10), and their difference is statistically significant. This suggests that on average small firms receive higher support on shareholder proposals compared to large firms. 23 The mean difference in support between extreme portfolios based on book-to-market ratio indicates that mutual funds provide higher percentage support on shareholder proposals to glamour stocks.
On the basis of performance, we observe that the mean percentage support for lowest performance portfolio (P1) is higher than that of the highest performance portfolios (P10), although the difference is significant only when both "for" or "abstain" votes are considered to be support of shareholder proposals. We further test the difference in voting behavior between the two extreme portfolios based on past performance on executive compensation issues. We observe that, on average, firms in the worst performing portfolio receive higher support (mean 0.235) on executive compensation issues than firms in the best performing portfolio (mean 0.073). The difference in mean between the worst and best performing portfolios is statistically significant (Pvalue 0.08). This suggests that mutual funds side with shareholders more on executive compensation issues for the extreme underperforming firms, thereby penalizing management for poor performance.
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B. Governance Mechanism
Cremers and Nair (2005) investigate how the market for corporate control, which is the external governance mechanism, interacts with shareholder activism, which is the internal governance mechanism. They show that external and internal governance mechanisms are complementary to each other, which results in long-term abnormal returns and profitability of firms. They use percentage of share ownership by public pension funds and by the largest blockholders as the proxy for the internal governance mechanism. As a proxy for the external governance mechanism they use the anti-takeover provisions (ATP) incorporated by the firms.
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Higher anti-takeover provisions (ATP) imply higher resistance for market for corporate control.
Hence, these firms are more likely to have entrenched management, as they are less likely to be disciplined by the takeover market. We investigate how the internal governance mechanism in the form of mutual funds' voting behavior interacts with the external governance mechanism in the form of market for corporate control. We test whether mutual funds engage in disciplining management through their voting behavior in the absence of an external monitoring force through the takeover market. In particular, we investigate whether mutual funds undertake a monitoring role in high ATP firms by providing higher support on shareholder proposals in order to reduce the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.
We use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance score of the firm in the year of the proposal as a measure of anti-takeover provisions of firms. The construction of the score predominantly considers anti-takeover provisions and hence the measure is accepted as an antitakeover provision (ATP) rather than a representation of the overall governance of the firm. The study documents that the GIM index is negatively related to firm value and stock return. The GIM index is constructed by 24 anti-takeover provisions published by Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC), giving each provision equal weight. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) argue that not all 24 IRRC provisions contribute equally to the negative correlation between GIM index and firm value. They identify six provisions among the 24 that reduce shareholders' protection: classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limit to amend bylaws, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The authors provide an entrenchment index (BCF) based on these six provisions and show that they have negative valuation consequences in firms, both individually and at the aggregate level. The authors further state that the other 18 provisions are not significantly negatively correlated with firm value.
We investigate the effect of existing anti-takeover provisions of firms on voting behavior of mutual funds using both GIM and BCF indices. We construct "Low ATP" and "High ATP" portfolios based on both GIM and BCF indices. In the case of GIM, we classify firms with a GIM index below 10 (sample median) as "Low ATP" portfolio and firms with a GIM index equal to or higher than 10 as "High ATP" portfolio. Following Masulis, Wang, and Xi (2006), we do not construct portfolios on the basis of a cut-off GIM index as mentioned in Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003), as this would reduce our sample size significantly. We also construct high and low ATP portfolios on the basis of BCF index, with a BCF index equal to or greater than three as "High ATP" portfolio and a BCF index less than three as "Low ATP" portfolio. In Table 7 , we present the mean and median percentage support on shareholder proposals for the portfolio of stocks constructed using governance indices. In panel A, we consider votes cast "for" or "abstain" as support of proposals (votes against management) and in panel B we only consider votes cast "for"
as support of proposals. We observe that at the aggregate level, the mean and median percentage of votes cast in favor of the shareholder proposals is higher for the "High ATP" portfolio compared to the "Low ATP" portfolio, for both GIM and BCF indices in both panels. Moreover, the difference in both the mean and median are statistically significant. We further test whether this difference in voting behavior is due to support for the proposals related to repeal of antitakeover provisions only or whether this persists in all proposal categories. We observe that for all categories of proposals, except for executive compensation issues, the "High ATP" portfolio receives higher percentage support compared to "Low ATP" portfolio for both the GIM and BCF indices, although not all are statistically significant. This implies that mutual funds side with shareholders more in their voting decisions on most types of proposals in firms with higher antitakeover provisions compared to firms with low anti-takeover provisions. This suggests that mutual funds undertake a stronger activist role in firms with entrenched management who are less likely to be disciplined by the takeover market. However, for executive compensation issues, the results suggest that for both GIM and BCF indices, the "High ATP" portfolio receive lower support than the "Low ATP" portfolio. This suggests that "management power" plays a role in the voting decision of mutual funds in the context of executive compensation; this requires further investigation in the future.
Empirical Models and Results
In this section, we examine mutual funds' voting behavior across firms for different shareholder proposals. Since the variation of voting patterns for a particular proposal across funds in a family is not a dominant feature, we analyze voting behavior at the fund family level. We examine whether mutual fund family voting is influenced by the family characteristics, characteristics and performance of the firm, governance structure of the firm, type of proposals, and ownership structure of the firm. Table 8 , votes cast "for" are considered to be support of shareholder proposals and vote against management. We run results considering votes cast "for" or "abstain" as support of shareholder proposals and the results (not reported) are qualitatively similar. Table 8 reports results of six regression models. In models 1, 2, and 3 we use the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (GIM)
index and in models 4, 5, and 6 we use the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell (BCF) index as a measure of firms' existing anti-takeover provisions. In all models we incorporate family level fixed effects.
In models 2 and 5, we introduce firm ownership variables. In models 3 and 6, in addition to ownership variables, we control for types of proposals.
A. Family Characteristics
We investigate whether bigger fund families are more supportive of management on shareholder proposals. To test this, we introduce an independent variable, FAMILY SIZE, which is the logarithm of the total net assets of all the funds in the family in the year of the shareholder proposal. In Table 8 , we observe that FAMILY SIZE has a negative significant effect even after controlling for the types of proposals and ownership data. This implies that bigger fund families are more supportive of management on shareholder proposals. We observe the effect of business ties by introducing a dummy variable BUSINESS TIES FAMILIES, which is equal to one if the fund family is among one of the conflicted ones as defined by Davis and Kim (2006) . 26 The negative and significant coefficient of the indicator variable BUSINESS TIES FAMILIES reconfirms that conflicted fund families tend to be less supportive of shareholder proposals and tend to side with management more often.
B. Firm Characteristics and Performance
Gordon and Pound (1993) show that voting outcome of shareholder proposals is influenced by firm characteristics and performance variables. We examine the effect of firm characteristics and performance variables on the voting behavior of mutual fund families. As a
firm characteristics variable, we analyze the effect of firm size, book-to-market, and major stock listing on the voting pattern. We observe that FIRM SIZE has a negative significant effect in all six models, suggesting that smaller firms receive higher support on shareholder proposals. As the manager of Olstein Financial Alert said "We want to focus on small companies, where we can have more influence." 27 We observe that BOOK-TO-MKT has negative significant effect suggesting that value stocks receive less support and glamour stocks receive more support on shareholder proposals.
In order to examine the effect of the information environment of firms, we introduce a dummy variable, MAJOR STOCK LISTING, which is equal to one if the firm is listed in one of the major stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) and zero otherwise. Exchange-listed firms have a more transparent information environment and therefore marginal gain for undertaking a monitoring role in these firms would be higher. We observe that the effect of MAJOR STOCK LISTING is positive and significant, suggesting that listed firms are more likely to receive higher support on shareholder proposals. Karpoff, Maletesta, & Walking (1996) argue that poorly performing firms attract shareholder proposals more. Smith (1996) reports that activist pension funds CalPERS consider poor performers as targets. We test whether mutual funds provide higher support on shareholder proposals in poorly performing firms in order to discipline management. As a measure of past performance of the firm we introduce HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN, which is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the firm over five years prior to and ending three months prior to the proposal meeting date. The results show that HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN has a positive significant effect in Table 8 , implying that higher the past long-run performance of the firm, the higher the support on shareholder proposals by mutual funds. This result contradicts the argument presented by Gordon and Pound (1993) , that shareholder proposals would gain higher support when the firms' performance has been worse, which raises a question about management competence. It is not clear why mutual funds provide higher support in good performing firms, but do not have an oversight in poorly performing ones. We explain this phenomenon by providing two arguments. Firms with good performance have higher visibility and a superior informational environment as a result of more coverage. This would lead to a low cost of monitoring, since information gathering would be less costly, thereby causing higher support on shareholder proposals for these firms. Another explanation could be due to the higher valuation consequence resulting from monitoring. Mutual funds follow good performing firms more closely and are more eager to improve performance of these firms through better governance provisions, as these firms are likely to have a higher impact in their overall portfolio valuation. However, we are unable to state what actually contributes to such voting behavior.
C. Governance Structure of the Firm.
In order to investigate the effect of governance structure of the firm on the voting behavior, we introduced the GIM (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) and BCF (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) ) indices, which measure the existing anti-takeover provisions of firms. 28 In Table 8 , the GIM index is used in models 1, 2, and 3 and the BCF index is used in models 4, 5, and 6. We also include DUAL CLASS, a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has dual class shares and 0 otherwise. In a recent paper, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick We observe that in Table 8 , both the GIM and BCF indices have a positive significant effect on percentage support in all models. Our results therefore imply that firms with a larger number of anti-takeover provisions (ATP) are likely to receive higher support on shareholder proposals. This suggests that mutual fund families engage in monitoring by supporting shareholder-sponsored proposals in firms that have a higher resistance for market for corporate control. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006) state that the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is more severe at firms with higher ATPs. They argue that managers in firms with higher ATPs are more likely to engage in acquisitions for empire building, as they are less likely to be disciplined by the market for corporate control. We argue that by supporting shareholder proposals more for higher ATP firms, mutual fund families engage in disciplining managers of the firms with weaker external monitoring mechanism in place and where shareholder-manager conflict of interest is likely to be higher.
The DUAL CLASS variable has negative and significant effect suggesting that mutual funds side with management in firms with dual class shares. The negative effect of the indicator variable DUAL CLASS can be explained by the notion that, mutual funds realize that their support on shareholders' proposals in dual class firms would not likely to change the final outcome, due to higher probability of receiving management support because of higher presence of insiders' voting rights, and thereby they take a passive role in these firms. This is in the same line of argument as presented in Stulz (1988) , where the author argue that higher voting rights of insiders decreases the probability of hostile takeover attempt as it reduces the probability of success. Similar argument is also presented in Mikkelson and Partch (1989) .
The effect of NUMBER OF PROPOSALS in all models in Table 8 is positive and significant. This indicates that mutual funds engage in an active monitoring role by supporting shareholder proposals in firms with higher market dissatisfaction and higher possibilities of improving governance structure.
D. Ownership Structure of Fund Family
The literature suggests that because of the free-rider problem, only investors with a large stake in the firm have incentives to undertake monitoring activities, since their gain from monitoring is likely to surpass the associated monitoring cost. 30 Davis and Kim (2006) examine whether mutual funds undertake costly monitoring role in firms in which their holdings are overweighted relative to a market portfolio. By investigating each individual fund's voting, they find that fund voting decision is independent of its portfolio weight. We analyze the effect of ownership structure in the fund family level, since the fund voting guidelines are established at the fund family level. We examine whether mutual fund families engage in monitoring when they have a higher ownership stake in the firm. To investigate the effect of ownership concentration we introduce the variable PERCENT SHARE HOLD, which is the percent of outstanding shares held by the fund family in the quarter of the proposal. The regression results in Table 8 show that
PERCENT SHARE HOLD has a negative significant effect after controlling for the different types of proposals. This suggests that higher ownership concentration would lead to higher support towards management by a fund family. 31 This relation could be due to the fact that fund companies have higher ownership in firms where they are supportive of management policies. A Wall Street Journal article in September 22, 2006 report that "Fund companies argue that it shouldn't come as a surprise that they back management. If they didn't like a company's direction, they wouldn't have bought, or they would sell."
E. Other Ownership Structure
We include INSIDER HOLD, which is percent of outstanding stock beneficially owned by managers and/or directors in the previous quarter of the proposal. In Table 8 , INSIDER HOLD has positive and significant effect even after controlling for type of proposals. This implies that higher the ownership concentration by managers and/or directors, higher the percentage support by mutual funds on shareholder proposals. This emphasizes the notion that mutual funds undertake active monitoring role in firms with higher management ownership concentration. This is in the line of the argument of management entrenchment hypothesis, and supports that firms with higher management ownership concentration require more monitoring rules in placed, as managers in these firms are likely to pursue empire building rather than maximizing shareholders' wealth.
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We introduce BLOCKHOLDER HOLD, which is the percentage of outstanding stock owned in the previous quarter of the proposal by 5-percent blockholders with no obvious management affiliation. Outside block-holder ownership is considered to be a part of internal monitoring mechanism. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the presence of large outside blockholders increases the likelihood of a firm being targeted for activism. Shivdasani (1993) finds positive relation between ownership by unaffiliated block-holders and the likelihood of a hostile takeover attempt. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find a positive relation between five largest institutional concentrations and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation.
They also show that top five institutional investor concentrations have a negative relation to the level of executive compensation. Moreover, often times, activist shareholders undertake a high ownership stake before launching a proxy fight or becoming involved in shareholder activism. 31 The evidence of the relation between institutional holdings and outcome on shareholder proposals is mixed. Gordon and Pound (1993) and Gillan and Starks (2000) suggest higher institutional holdings lead to higher positive outcome of shareholder proposals. Romano (2002) These activists carry out a wide ranging campaign to obtain more support, which might lead mutual funds to take part in a similar role. Our results on BLOCKHOLDER HOLD show a positive and significant effect on percentage of support. This suggests that higher blockholder ownership concentration would lead to higher support on shareholder proposals by mutual funds.
This implies that presence of higher internal governance mechanism through outside block-holder ownership influence funds to vote against management.
F. Types of Proposals
According to Gordon and Pound (1993) proposals that suggest clear restoration of shareholder power may receive more support than proposals that are more qualitative and difficult to assess. 33 We investigate whether the voting pattern of mutual fund families varies with types of proposals. In Table 8 , we observe the effects of proposal types in models 3 and 6. We observe that mutual fund families provide significant support on anti-takeover and voting related proposals. Mutual fund families' support of these proposals highlights the fact that they undertake a monitoring role when shareholder proposals involve governance provisions that increase shareholder wealth and rights. 34 The results also suggest that mutual fund families take management sides on executive compensation issues. With recent scandals and debates over executive compensation issues, these proposals should be under greater scrutiny. The AFL-CIO Web site describes CEO pay as follows: "Every year, shareholders and America's workers learn of new jaw-dropping executive compensation packages that seem to defy rational explanation.
Too often, the CEO pay system enriches executives without regard to their individual performance or realistic contribution to their company." The Web site also promotes that the proxy voting is the most direct means for shareholders to exercise oversight of the companies they own. Union-sponsored funds submitted 43 percent of corporate governance proposals in 2004. Many of these proposals regarded executive compensation, which accounted for more than 40 percent of all governance proposals. Murphy (1999) provides a detailed study of executive compensation. The author reports that the average S&P 500 CEO received 90 times more in cash compensation than the average earnings of a factory worker in 1996. The total realized compensation of CEOs is 210 times more than the earnings of production workers. This is up from 30 times more in 1970. With all the shareholder activism focused on executive compensation, the question remains as to why mutual funds are not taking an active monitoring 33 Gillan and Starks (2000) and Romano (2002) also investigate effect of types of proposals. 34 Our proposals related to repeal of anti-takeover provisions are among the six anti-takeover provisions identified by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) which have negative valuation consequences.
role in guarding shareholders' interests in these matters. Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) show that institutional ownership concentration is negatively related to the level of executive compensation, suggesting that institutions serve as a monitoring role in reducing the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. Their results also suggest that institutions prefer firms with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Using the voting mechanism, mutual funds could undertake a more direct monitoring role in the governance mechanism that is concerned with executive compensation. The question that then remains is whether this inclination toward providing support to management on their compensation issues is due to the business ties or due to some other incentives that are not visible to the public. This requires further investigation.
Effect of Mutual Funds' Voting Records of Shareholder Proposals on Fund Reputation
In this section, we investigate the incentive structure of mutual funds for exercising their voting power to guard shareholders' interests. Davis and Kim (2006) argue that if fund management's activism increases portfolio value through better governance provisions, this will eventually lead to a better reputation and higher revenues. One intriguing question is, would mutual funds experience a direct reputational effect for supporting shareholder proposals, which is not through the valuation consequences as a result of the implementation of better governance provisions? In particular, we investigate whether mutual funds' release of the voting records on shareholder proposals effect the funds' asset flow. If mutual fund activism improves the funds' reputation, then higher support of shareholder proposals by the funds would likely increase the funds' asset flow after the release of voting records. This direct affect would act as a stronger incentive for funds to actively engage in shareholder activism and support shareholder proposals.
We report our analysis in Table 9 , where the dependent variable is FUND FLOW j , which is the objective adjusted net asset flow of mutual fund j over the next year of the mutual fund voting record release date. Flow reflects the growth of the funds that is not due to the rate of return earned on the assets under management, but due to new external money. We compute the objective adjusted net asset flow by subtracting from jt Flow the median asset flow of all funds within the same objective taking the median of this percentage over all stocks by the fund. In models 1 and 3 votes cast "for" are considered to be support of shareholder proposals and in models 2 and 4 votes cast "for"
or "abstain" are considered to be support of shareholder proposals.
The literature suggests that fund asset flows depend on the fund's performance 36 . In models 1 and 2 we use objective adjusted return (OAR) to control for fund performance.
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Objective adjusted return of fund is measured over the previous year of the filing date of the voting records. We observe that OAR is positive and significant, as expected. In models 3 and 4
we use four-factor alpha to control for fund performance. 38 Four-FACTOR ALPHA is also positive and significant. To control for the fund's previous asset flow, we introduce the variable PREV YEAR AVG NAF, which is the fund's objective adjusted net asset flows over the previous 12 months of the filing date of the voting records. 39 We also observe that PREV YEAR AVG NAF has a positive and significant effect. We introduce FUND AGE, which is the log of the age of a fund, and observe that it has an insignificant effect on the fund's asset flow. 40 To control for the influence of fees we assume an average of a seven-year holding period for fund investors.
Hence, we construct the control variable FEES as the sum of the expense ratio and one-seventh of all load charged by the fund. 41 We also observe that FEE has an insignificant effect. After controlling for fund size, age, fee, performance, and previous asset flow, our results show that MEDIAN PERCENT SUPPORT BY FUND has a positive significant effect on dependent variable FUND FLOW. This implies that higher median percentage support of shareholder proposals by mutual funds would increase the fund's future asset flow significantly. The implication is very significant, as this suggests that mutual funds could experience a direct benefit in their future business potential by engaging in shareholder activism through the voting mechanism. This positive impact on the mutual funds' reputation would give them more incentive 36 Sirri & Tufano (1998), Ippolito (1992) , Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994) . 37 Following Khorana, Tufano & Wedge (2006) we measure OAR as follows: OAR is defined as the annual return of the fund minus the median return of the funds within the same objective and computed as follows:
where jt R is the return of fund j in month t and ot R is the median return of all funds within the same objective in month t, and t=0 is the month of voting record release. 38 Ippolito (1992) , Patel, Zeckhauser, & Hendricks (1994) , Harless & Peterson (1998 ), Gruber (1996 , Jain & Wu (2000) and Lynch & Musto (2003) : use Jensen's alpha or multi-factor alpha 39 Zeckhauser, Patel and Hendricks (1991) 40 Bergstresset & Poterba (2002) and DelGuercio & Tkac (2002) 41 Khorana & Servaes (2004) to monitor and could outweigh the cost of alienating the clients in the portfolio firms. We realize that the increased value of the fund flow could be due to increased valuation of the portfolio firms as a result of the higher governance measures implemented by the voting mechanism and might not be a direct effect of the mutual fund voting record release. However, the increased valuation due to better governance through shareholder proposals would only be implemented if the outcome of the vote were a success. There could be many instances where mutual funds vote "yes" for a shareholder proposal and the final outcome is a rejection, or vice versa. We argue that whether or not the fund's reputation is directly influenced by the fund's voting or indirectly through the higher valuation via better governance implementation, our results imply that the mutual funds have higher incentives for actively engaging in shareholder activism. We perform separate regressions for Anti-takeover, Voting Issues, and Shareholder Rights proposals. The results are qualitatively similar.
Analysis of Mutual Fund Trading Behavior after Voting Records Release
In this section, we investigate the trading behavior of mutual funds after the release of voting records. 42 The existing notion is that institutional investors sell their shares when We further examine the difference in mean percent hold change between two groups of mutual funds: mutual funds that provide higher than average percentage support and mutual funds that provide lower than average percentage support (these results are not shown in table). The mean percent hold change by the mutual funds that provide higher than average support to shareholder proposals is -0.61 percent and the mean percent hold change by the mutual funds that provide lower than average support to shareholders' proposals is 0.03 percent, and the difference is statistically significant (p-value 0.05).
Our results therefore imply that funds that support management in their voting strategies continue to provide support by promoting the stock in the market after the release of voting records by increasing their holdings. The question is, why do the funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings of the firm in their portfolio? Is it due to the hostility that is created between funds and firm management because of the activist role by mutual funds? If mutual funds intend to benefit from the higher governance provisions through the voting mechanism, then one would expect them to maintain or increase their holdings after they provide support to shareholder proposals. One other explanation could be that these mutual funds that provide support to shareholder proposals are not very optimistic about the final outcome of the proposals and therefore reduce their holdings. This supports the notion that when mutual funds do not approve of the management style and dislike the governance structure of the firm, they sell their shares and move on. Nevertheless, they undertake an activist role before selling their shares in order to promote shareholders' rights in these firms.
Conclusion
We investigate the proxy voting behavior of shareholder proposals by 433 mutual funds from 24 fund families on 528 firms. We investigate three main questions. What are the factors that influence mutual funds' voting behavior? What is the incentive structure of mutual funds for undertaking an activist role in voting for shareholder proposals? Finally, how do the funds trade after they release their proxy voting records?
Our results suggest that bigger fund families are more supportive of management. We find that firms with higher visibility receive more support from mutual funds on shareholder proposals. The effects of ownership on voting decisions indicate that mutual funds do not undertake a monitoring role when they have a large ownership stake in a firm. However, we observe that mutual funds seem to have a superior oversight when they have a longer investment horizon. This suggests that their motivation to take on an activist role does not come from the ownership structure, but rather from their long-term investment goal.
We also find that the existing governance structure of the firm influences the funds' voting policies. Mutual funds undertake a monitoring role through their voting behavior in firms that are less likely to be disciplined by the market for corporate control. This suggests that in the absence of an external governance mechanism, an internal governance mechanism through voting provisions undertake substitute monitoring role in disciplining managers. The presence of higher internal governance mechanism through outside block-holder ownership influence funds to vote against management. In addition, the possibility of management entrenchment through higher level of managerial ownership leads to superior monitoring by mutual funds. However, the presence of higher voting rights of insiders in dual class shares discourages mutual funds to vote against management, as their voting is unlikely to change the outcome of the proposal. The results further indicate that mutual funds engage in an active monitoring role by supporting shareholder proposals in firms with higher market dissatisfaction and higher possibilities of improving governance structure.
Mutual funds' voting behavior is also influenced by the types of proposals. The proposals related to anti-takeover provisions, which have a direct positive effect on shareholders wealth and rights, receive higher support. However, mutual funds predominantly seem to side with management on issues related to executive compensation. Analyzing this behavior requires a better understanding of the relation between mutual funds' management and company management that goes beyond the published business ties. We leave this for future research.
We study the incentive structure of mutual funds that could act as a motivational force for them to undertake an activist role in their proxy voting behavior. We examine whether the future business potential of mutual funds is likely to be influenced if mutual funds engage in guarding shareholders' interests in shareholder proposals. Our results suggest that higher support of shareholder proposals by mutual funds has a positive effect on the funds' future asset flow. This supports the notion that there is a positive reputational effect for mutual funds for undertaking a monitoring role in their proxy voting behavior.
Finally, we observe the trading behavior of mutual funds after the release of voting records. The results indicate that mutual funds engage in selling their portfolio shares when they provide higher support on shareholder proposals. One explanation could be that, mutual funds that provide support to non-binding shareholder proposals are not very optimistic about the final outcome of the proposals and therefore reduce their holdings. This supports the notion that mutual funds engage in "Wall Street Walk" when they dislike the managements' policy.
Nevertheless, they undertake an activist role before selling their shares in order to promote shareholders' rights in these firms.
Overall, our study provides a framework for understanding mutual funds' voting patterns across firms. The results indicate that there is intricacy involved in these voting decisions. In a nutshell, the results suggest that mutual funds undertake a monitoring role for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders' wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and in firms where they are likely to have higher influence: such as small firms, non-dual stock firms and higher block-holder ownership firms. However, the results do not necessarily indicate that the mutual fund industry was engaged in a similar voting pattern before the release of the proxy voting records. The results only highlight the pattern of mutual fund voting when they are aware that these proxy voting records would undergo close scrutiny. FIRM SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of firm in the previous quarter of the proposal. BOOK TO MKT is the book-to-market ratio of the firm in the previous quarter of the proposal. RETURN PAST 90 DAYS is the buy and hold abnormal return of the firm over 90 days prior to proposal meeting date. LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN is the buy and hold abnormal return of the firm over five years prior to and ending three months prior to proposal meeting date. MAJOR STOCK LISTING is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the stock is listed in one of the major stock market. GIM is the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick governance score of the firm in the year of the proposal. BCF is the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell governance measure of the firm in the year of the proposal. NUMBER OF PROPOSALS is the number of shareholder proposals for a particular firm. PERCENT SHARE HOLD is the percent of outstanding shares held by the fund family in the quarter of proposal. PERCENT VOTING SHARE is the percent of voting shares in the portfolio. This is computed by dividing the number of voting shares by the total number of shares owned by the fund family in the quarter of proposal. ALL INST HOLD is the percent of outstanding shares held by all institutional investors in the previous quarter of proposal. BLOCKHOLDER HOLD is the percent of outstanding shares held by non-management five percent blockholder in the previous quarter of the proposal. INSIDER HOLD is the percent of outstanding shares held by managers and/or directors in the previous quarter of the proposal. The table presents the mean and median percentage support for shareholder proposals for extreme portfolios of stocks based on size, book-to-market and performance. The number of observation is presented in the bracket. FIRM SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of firm in the previous quarter of the proposal. Ten size based portfolios are formed, where P1 represents portfolio with smallest firms and P10 represents portfolio with largest firms. BOOK TO MKT is the bookto-market ratio of the firm in the previous quarter of the proposal. Ten portfolios based on book-tomarket ratio are formed, where P1 represents portfolio of glamour stocks and P10 represents portfolio of value stocks. HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN is buy and hold abnormal return of the firm over five years prior to and ending three months prior to proposal meeting date and represents long run past performance. Performance based portfolios represent P1 as the worst performing firms and P10 as the best performing firms. For each portfolio of stocks, the table reports the mean and median of the percentage support on shareholder proposals by all the fund families in the sample and the statistical significance of the differences between the two extreme portfolios. In panel (A), votes cast "for" or "abstain" are considered as support of shareholder proposals. In panel (B), votes cast "for" are considered to be support of shareholder proposals. Fund portfolio turnover ratio is a proxy for investment horizon. Fund portfolio turnover ratio is computed by dividing the minimum of aggregate sales or aggregate purchase of securities by the average 12 month total net assets of the funds. Funds are ranked in ten deciles based on turnover ratio in ascending order, with decile 1 the least turnover funds (long investment horizon) and decile 10 the most turnover funds (short investment horizon). The average percentage votes cast as "for" and "against" on shareholders' proposals by these ten deciles portfolio of funds is plotted. Percentage vote casts as "for" on shareholder proposals vs. fund turnover deciles is presented in Figure 1A . Percentage vote casts as "against" on shareholder proposals vs. fund turnover deciles is presented in Figure 1B . 
4-FACTOR ALPHA
The annualize 4-factor alpha. This is computed over the previous three-year period of the filing date of the voting records using monthly returns of the mutual funds, and then annualized.
TRACKING ERROR
Tracking error is the annualized standard deviation of the residuals from the 3-facotr model regression. This is computed over the previous three-year period (filing date) using monthly return of mutual funds.
PREV YEAR AVG NAF
Fund objective adjusted net asset flows over the previous 12 months of the filing date of the voting records 
